On 27 March, ARTICLE 19 had the opportunity to witness firsthand Taiwan’s latest whole-of-society resilience exercise training. This exercise marked a significant milestone as the first civil defence drill conducted under the newly established Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. Designed to simulate large-scale natural disasters such as tsunamis or coordinated attacks on critical information infrastructure, the training was emblematic of Taiwan’s growing recognition that national security must include more than military readiness. The inclusion of civil society and other actors in the simulation is further indicative of Taiwan’s broader commitment to multistakeholderism.
This exercise was unprecedented due to the whole– of– society approach employed at both the central and local levels. Government authorities joined forces with civil society and grassroots organisations: participants included the Office of the President, the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, city government representatives, as well as religious groups and self-organising community networks. This collaboration demonstrated a step toward a model of whole-of-society approach to crisis, rooted not only in state capacity, but in transparency, public participation, and shared responsibility.
As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted large joint army, navy, and rocket force exercises around Taiwan at the beginning of April, Taiwan’s commitment to advancing preparedness for whole-of-society resilience is more urgent than ever.
A resilient democracy must go beyond physical protection; it must also include the safeguarding of information integrity. This means, first and foremost, ensuring that the right to freedom of expression is always protected, and inclusive access to reliable information before, during, and after a crisis is guaranteed.
ARTICLE 19 offers the following policy considerations to the government of Taiwan to further strengthen its approach.
1.Protecting the information infrastructure – both in physical and digital terms – must be a national priority. The integrity of Taiwan’s data centres, undersea cables, broadcasting hubs, and telecommunications nodes is essential for emergency response and public’s ability to communicate during a crisis. These systems must be physically secure and resilient not only to natural disasters but also deliberate attacks and other potential causes of disruption. Taiwan should continue developing backup communication systems and alternative energy sources to power critical information infrastructure during blackouts or cyberattacks.
2. Access to reliable information in a crisis must be timely, inclusive, and equitable. Emergency alerts – such as those sent via cell broadcast SMS during the exercise on March 27th – should be timely, multilingual, and accessible to all, particularly marginalised communities. Moreover, communities must be equipped with alternative information access points when smartphones fail, or internet access is disrupted. This includes instructions on how to access trusted news via FM radio or community bulletin boards, where to go to charge devices, and where to find in-person updates and assistance.
3. Taiwan’s government must strengthen its strategic communication capabilities well before a crisis unfolds. It must act rather than react. If government messaging is delayed or unclear, it leaves the information space more vulnerable to information manipulation. At the same time, crisis communications must never become a cover for censorship. Any responses to information manipulation must be in full respect of human rights principles, transparent in process, and open to scrutiny by the media, civil society organizations and the wider public to ensure accountability. Taiwan’s already vibrant civic tech community and innovations in fact checking offers a model for growth in other jurisdictions.
4. Taiwan should conduct regular public messaging audits. Some existing crisis-related digital platforms – such as the Health Passport or the Fire Service App – have low adoption rates. ARTICLE 19 recommends that these tools are reevaluated and redesigned for usability, visibility, and public trust.
5. The integration of civil society organisations and private sector actors into resilience planning should be increased. This includes developing clear channels for verification, coordination, and communication during emergencies for civil society. They are often the first to provide responses in time of crisis and are most trusted by local communities. Likewise, private sector actors, especially technology companies like Meta and Google, play a critical role in shaping public discourse, including through their content moderation. Taiwan should engage with these companies to increase their transparency about their crisis protocols, moderation policies, and contingency planning in the Taiwanese context.
ARTICLE 19 also urges the government to ensure these firms are plugged into national resilience planning in concrete, accountable ways. At the same time, we highlight that any engagement with the private sector, in particular around finding responses to information manipulation, must be strictly in line with international freedom of expression standards and the principles of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality.
Fundamentally, resilience is not just about bunkers. It is about ensuring that, even in the darkest hour, people can still communicate, stay informed, and engage in public discourse. Taiwan’s path forward must place the right to information and coordinated, rights-based communication planning at the heart of its national defence strategy.