This op-ed was written by Ivana Milosavljević, who was one of four journalists to win ARTICLE 19’s Ethical Journalism Award for the West Balkans, part of ARTICLE 19’s #CheckItFirst campaign.
In November of last year, a month before the elections in Serbia, I got the opportunity to work at a call centre for the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). They didn’t know I was a journalist. But they also didn’t ask who I was. I got the job through a recommendation, with a ‘small condition’ attached – that I vote for the Progressives, take a picture of my ballot, and send it to the call centre organiser.
In return, I got the job. The daily wage was 3,000 Serbian dinars, paid in cash every Monday. Although it had been rumoured for years that the SNS buys votes and blackmails voters in various ways, no one had been able to prove it. It was a ‘public secret’.
That’s why we decided that I, as a journalist, would infiltrate and record everything. This required serious preparation with very little time. I had to delete my profiles from all social networks, the Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia (CINS) deleted my name from their website, and we did our best to clean my digital footprint.
Since I used my real name (we didn’t know that at some point in the process they would ask for my ID), erasing my digital footprint was crucial.
No one was allowed to know what I was doing. Not my family, not my friends, nor my colleagues. The reason was simple – the more people knew, the greater the risk that our plan would be leaked.
The editor, the colleague I was working with on the story, and I met several times with a lawyer to determine if he could defend us in court if it came to a lawsuit. Especially since our plan was to secretly film in the call centre and the payment of the honorarium (though in the end we took photographs instead). It is important to note that the penalty for unauthorised recording and publishing of such recordings is up to three years in prison. Additionally, the journalistic code of ethics stipulates that unauthorised recording is not allowed, except when it protects the public interest.
Our assessment, and that of the lawyer, was that the information was of significant public interest and that we should tell the story.
And we did. At the end of November 2023, we published the story ‘CINS Inside SNS’s Call Center: Hostess Agency, Vote Buying, and Millions in Cash’.
The article described how the Hostess Agency, which had been providing women as ‘hostesses’ for promotions, corporate events, fairs, and TV commercials, also employed people to work in the call centre. It was just one business involved in a large group that helped facilitate vote rigging and money changing hands for votes.
Then we waited for public institutions’ reactions.
On the same day the story was published, we asked the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade if they would give their reaction. They told us that if the Republic (RIK) or City Election Commission (GIK) found irregularities, they should inform them. However, GIK told us that it is not the job of the election commissions to determine facts about the SNS call centre.
After 48 hours, the most-watched commercial television station in Serbia aired President Aleksandar Vučić’s comment on the call centre story. He explained to the public that the existence of call centres is not illegal, but he did not address the main findings of our investigation, particularly the vote buying.
Then opposition actors got involved. Two members of parliament from the opposition filed a criminal complaint against all those involved in our investigation. This complaint then started moving from the First Basic Public Prosecutor’s Office to the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office and back to the First. They were trying to determine who was responsible for the case, while it looked from the outside like they were passing a hot potato from hand to hand.
Finally, Transparency Serbia filed a complaint with the Anti-Corruption Agency. The Agency asked the SNS, the Hostess Agency, and the non-governmental organisation Center for Education and Development of Youth in Belgrade CEROB whether they were connected and whether they had any contracts with the call centre. They all denied that any such contracts existed. As a result, the Anti-Corruption Agency concluded that there were no grounds to investigate any violations of the law.
This also explained why the SNS did not report the costs of organising the call centre in its campaign expense report, which must be submitted to the Agency after each election.
The SNS call centre case is a perfect analysis and example of the way institutions in Serbia function – from the fact that no one wants to take responsibility for acting on publicly-disclosed information to the fact that even when there is an official complaint, there are no further investigations or checks.
For citizens, this investigation was enough to prove that the ‘open secret’ actually exists. For the institutions, evidently not. But perhaps they never wanted the evidence in the first place.