The Domain Name System (DNS) is the backbone of the internet: it allows us to find what we’re looking for and makes the internet easier to navigate.
Thanks to the DNS, to find ARTICLE 19’s website we just have to remember a simple domain name (‘article19.org’). Without it, we’d have to remember a complex string of numbers (e.g. ‘2606:4700:10::ac42:a320’). And we’d have to remember a different string of numbers for each and every website we want to visit.
Yet worldwide, governments are weaponising the DNS to censor content, silence critics, and stifle the free flow of information.
Increasingly, rather than blocking single pages (like the one you’re now reading), they are making entire domains inaccessible (such as every page starting with ‘article19.org’ – thousands of pages spanning three decades).
This is unnecessary, disproportionate, and supercharges the risk of violating our right to speak and to know.
It’s like damming a river to catch a fish.
All companies have a responsibility to protect human rights.
Yet too often, the entities that operate domains comply with suspension requests – even when they don’t legally have to – resulting in censorship of legitimate speech. This gives them an outsized role as arbiters of what we can see and say online.
And they make their decisions in the dark: no oversight, no transparency, no due process. This makes it virtually impossible to challenge them, leaves civil society vulnerable to censorship, and deprives the public of their right to know.
What’s more, because DNS governance is so complex and opaque, neither policymakers nor civil society recognise how much power these entities wield – let alone what to do about it.
That’s where our new report comes in.
ARTICLE 19’s new report demystifies DNS abuse and shows how we can ensure the DNS is not used to silence voices.
Key questions answered
The Domain Name System (DNS) helps us find our way around the internet.
It’s the reason why, to find ARTICLE 19’s website, you simply have to remember ‘article19.org’ (our domain name) rather than a complex string of numbers (our IP address).
Without the DNS, we’d have to remember the unique IP address of every single website we want to visit. With the DNS, we can just remember the domain name. The DNS then connects the domain name (words) to the IP address (numbers) to find us what we’re looking for.
This makes the internet easier to use – and information easier to access – for everyone.
How DNS abuse is defined determines what content stays online and what gets removed.
Yet there is no universally agreed definition of DNS abuse.
Different players define it differently – when they define it at all.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) defines DNS abuse narrowly: botnets, malware distribution, pharming, phishing, and spam.
While their definition is not perfect, it is better than having none at all (as is the case for some registries: see below) – and its narrowness prevents the kind of overreach that could violate online expression.
Some registries stick to ICANN’s definition of DNS abuse. Others supplement it with their own categories of abuse – from child sexual abuse material (CSAM) to content that is ‘defamatory’ or ‘contrary to public policy’. Still others don’t define it at all.
Registries that operate domains like ‘.com’ or ‘.org’ are contractually bound by ICANN’s definition. This means they have to respond to all reports of DNS abuse that adhere to that definition. But how they respond is up to them – and some do so by suspending more content than necessary, which risks infringing on expression.
Registries that operate national domains, like ‘.uk’ (UK) or ‘.br’ (Brazil), aren’t bound by ICANN’s definition. And these registries often have close ties with governments, which can pressure them to remove content that doesn’t align with their politics.
How DNS abuse is defined determines what content stays online when abuse is reported.
Inconsistent definitions lead to inconsistent responses. One registry might respond to a report of DNS abuse by suspending a domain; another, faced with exactly the same report, might do nothing at all.
And where a registry lacks a definition of DNS abuse altogether, it becomes impossible to differentiate between legitimate suspensions (e.g. of a domain hosting CSAM) and repressive overreach.
While DNS abuse can affect anyone with a website, ARTICLE 19 has witnessed a growing trend of governments using it to censor critical voices.
From journalists in Belarus to activists in India, our new report reveals how state actors are weaponising DNS abuse to silence dissent.
This violates both their right to speak and the public’s right to know – the twin rights that, together, make up freedom of expression.
Protecting expression at the infrastructure level of the internet requires all hands on deck:
- ICANN: ICANN maintains the DNS and creates the policies that domain operators implement.
It therefore plays an outsized role in ending DNS abuse.
- Domain operators: Deciding whether to suspend a domain is up to the operator of that domain.
These companies also have human rights obligations. To fulfil those obligations, they should make
their decisions transparently, proportionately, on a case-by-case basis, and with due process.
- Governments: Ultimately, it is our governments that are responsible for protecting our right to
freedom of expression. They must stop weaponising the DNS to censor, silence, and stifle critical voices
– and stop pressuring domain operators to act as content moderators.
Our report sets out how all of the above can keep the DNS an open, decentralised enabler of access to information – and how civil society can build resilience to its abuse.
The human impact of DNS abuse
India: Activists’ websites vanish as campaign gains traction
Belarus: Journalists’ association censored beyond borders
Spain: Catalonian domains blocked in run-up to referendum
Nicaragua: Regime ‘disappears’ websites of exiled media outlets
Recommendations
- Uphold human rights responsibilities in accordance with the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
- Clearly define DNS abuse.
- Assess DNS abuse reports on a case-by-case basis.
- Implement escalating mitigation-response procedures.
- Enshrine transparency in both internal operations and external reporting.
- Establish recourse and redress mechanisms.
- Conduct public consultations when amending policies or terms and conditions.
- Develop accessible resources to increase understanding of what domain operators can and cannot do.
Our report provides more detail on all of the above.
- Work with the ICANN community (such as the non-commercial stakeholder group) to firmly reiterate ICANN’s human rights commitments.
- Standardise due process and recourse mechanisms.
Our report provides more detail on the above.
- Protect, respect and fulfil human rights.
- Conduct human rights impact assessments when developing regulation requiring the use of domain suspensions.
- Clearly stipulate parameters for domain-suspension orders.
- Integrate public consultations when developing legislation that could implicate internet operators.
- Clearly define policies pertaining to or impacting the DNS.
- Build the capacity of policymakers working on digital issues.
- Recognise the varying roles of internet operators and their remit when addressing online content.
Our report provides more detail on all of the above.
- Gather relevant information pertaining to the registry or registrar’s policies.
- Consider the jurisdiction of the registry when registering a domain name.
- Regularly back up all content on websites and email servers.
- Decentralise domain-operator services and email services.
- Consider the contact information shared with the registry when registering the domain.
- Inform partners and networks as soon as a domain has been suspended or seized.
- Contest domain suspensions through appeal mechanisms.
- Develop a plan ahead of time for moving online resources to a new registry.
- Develop a rapid-response advocacy campaign.
Our report provides more detail on all of the above.
The DNS was designed to enable access to information – not stifle it.
Let’s keep it that way.
Find out more
ICANN: Why the DNS and content moderation shouldn’t mix
ICANN: New CEO and the opportunity to reiterate human rights commitments
Bridging the Gap: Local voices in content moderation
Internet: Content moderation at infrastructure level puts rights at risk
Online freedoms: Safeguards must be balanced with free expression
